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Summary
Background Non-pharmaceutical interventions have been implemented to reduce transmission of severe acute 
respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in the UK. Projecting the size of an unmitigated epidemic and the 
potential effect of different control measures has been crucial to support evidence-based policy making during the 
early stages of the epidemic. This study assesses the potential impact of different control measures for mitigating 
the burden of COVID-19 in the UK.
Methods We used a stochastic age-structured transmission model to explore a range of intervention scenarios, 
tracking 66·4 million people aggregated to 186 county-level administrative units in England, Wales, Scotland, and 
Northern Ireland. The four base interventions modelled were school closures, physical distancing, shielding of people 
aged 70 years or older, and self-isolation of symptomatic cases. We also modelled the combination of these 
interventions, as well as a programme of intensive interventions with phased lockdown-type restrictions that 
substantially limited contacts outside of the home for repeated periods. We simulated different triggers for the 
introduction of interventions, and estimated the impact of varying adherence to interventions across counties. For 
each scenario, we projected estimated new cases over time, patients requiring inpatient and critical care (ie, admission 
to the intensive care units [ICU]) treatment, and deaths, and compared the effect of each intervention on the basic 
reproduction number, R0.
Findings We projected a median unmitigated burden of 23 million (95% prediction interval 13–30) clinical cases and 
350 000 deaths (170 000–480 000) due to COVID-19 in the UK by December, 2021. We found that the four base 
interventions were each likely to decrease R0, but not sufficiently to prevent ICU demand from exceeding health 
service capacity. The combined intervention was more effective at reducing R0, but only lockdown periods were 
sufficient to bring R0 near or below 1; the most stringent lockdown scenario resulted in a projected 120 000 cases 
(46 000–700 000) and 50 000 deaths (9300–160 000). Intensive interventions with lockdown periods would need to be 
in place for a large proportion of the coming year to prevent health-care demand exceeding availability.
Interpretation The characteristics of SARS-CoV-2 mean that extreme measures are probably required to bring the 
epidemic under control and to prevent very large numbers of deaths and an excess of demand on hospital beds, 
especially those in ICUs.
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Introduction
Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 
(SARS-CoV-2) has spread to multiple countries after 
causing an initial outbreak of COVID-19 in Wuhan, 
China.1 Early evidence indicated SARS-CoV-2 was capable 
of sustained human-to-human transmission2 and could 
cause severe disease,3 with a higher risk of severe and 
fatal outcomes in older individuals.4 The first two cases 
of COVID-19 in the UK were confirmed on Jan 31, 2020. 
Although implementation of testing, isolation, and 
contact tracing probably slowed early transmission,5 it 
was not sufficient to contain the outbreak in the UK.
Following the introduction of extensive control 
measures in Wuhan in late January, including—among 
other measures—travel restrictions, physical distancing, 
and requirements for residents to stay within their homes, 
there was a substantial decline in local trans mission.6–8 
Physical distancing measures, such as clo sure of schools, 
retail businesses, and restaurants, as well as constraints 
on individual movements and social interactions, are now 
in place in many countries with the aim of reducing 
transmission of SARS-CoV-2.9,10
Several studies have explored the potential effect of 
control measures on the dynamics of COVID-19.8,11–15 
These studies have broadly suggested that moderate 
measures could reduce epidemic size, but more intensive 
measures would be required to ensure health system 
capacity was not surpassed.
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However, it remains unclear precisely how the timing, 
duration, and intensity of different measures targeting 
transmission and burden can reduce the impact of 
COVID-19 in the UK. Here, based upon scenarios 
originally presented to scientific advisory bodies in the UK, 
we use a mathematical model to assess the potential 
impact of different control measures for mitigating the 
burden of COVID-19 in the general UK population, and 
evaluate possible medium-term scenarios as the most 
restrictive short-term measures are eventually lifted.
Methods
Dynamic transmission model
In this modelling study, we analysed a stochastic com-
partmental model stratified into 5-year age bands, with 
individuals classified according to current disease status 
(figure 1) and transmission between age groups in the 
community based on UK social mixing patterns (full 
details in the appendix pp 2–5).16,17 Briefly, all individuals 
in the model start as susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 infection, 
and enter the exposed state upon effective contact with 
an infectious person. After a latent period lasting 4 days 
on average, exposed individuals become infectious, 
either with a preclinical infection (lasting 1·5 days on 
average) followed by a clinical infection (lasting 3·5 days 
on average), or with a subclinical infection (lasting 5 days 
on average). After the infectious period, individuals enter 
the removed state due to recovery or isolation and cannot 
be reinfected. Subclinical infections are those which 
result in few or no symptoms and hence, along with 
preclinical infections before symptom on set, are unlikely 
to be ascertained under syndromic surveillance; we 
assumed that subclinical infections are 50% as infectious 
as preclinical and clinical infections. COVID-19 shows 
markedly different dynamics in children than in adults.16 
Therefore, we assumed that older individuals are more 
likely to show clinical symptoms, adopting the results of 
an analysis of COVID-19 case data across six countries 
from December, 2019, to March, 2020 (appendix p 4).16 
The model tracks 66·4 million people aggregated to the 
186 county-level administrative units in England, Wales, 
Scotland, and Northern Ireland.
We ran 200 stochastic simulations for each modelled 
scenario, choosing a randomly selected value for the basic 
reproduction number R0—which describes the average 
number of secondary infections caused by a typical 
primary infection in a completely susceptible population—
for each simulation; the random values of R0 were chosen 
from a normal distribution with mean 2·7 (SD 0·6; see 
section on key model parameters below). We also chose a 
random date of SARS-CoV-2 introduction for each 
administrative unit, with London boroughs seeded within 
the first week and all other administrative units seeded 
within the first 4 weeks of the epidemic (appendix pp 3–4). 
Case estimates are of clinical cases (figure 1). For 
each scenario, we report the median outcome and 
95% prediction intervals (PIs), which are generated from 
Research in context
Evidence before this study
As countries have moved from early containment 
efforts to planning for the introduction of large-scale non-
pharmaceutical interventions to control COVID-19 outbreaks, 
epidemic modelling studies have explored the potential for 
extensive physical distancing measures to curb transmission. 
However, it remains unclear how different combinations of 
interventions, timings, and triggers for the introduction and 
lifting of control measures could affect the impact of the 
epidemic on health services, and what the range of uncertainty 
associated with these estimates would be.
Added value of this study
Using a stochastic, age-structured epidemic model, we explored 
how eight different intervention scenarios could influence the 
number of new cases and deaths, as well as intensive care beds 
required over the projected course of the epidemic. We also 
assessed the potential impact of local versus national targeting 
of interventions, reduction in leisure events, increased childcare 
by grandparents, and timing of triggers for different control 
measures. We simulated multiple realisations for each scenario 
to reflect uncertainty in possible epidemic trajectories.
Implications of all the available evidence
Our results support early modelling findings, and subsequent 
empirical observations, that in the absence of control measures, 
a COVID-19 epidemic could quickly overwhelm a health-care 
system. We found that even a combination of moderate 
interventions—such as school closures, shielding of older 
people, and self-isolation of symptomatic individuals—would 
be unlikely to prevent an epidemic that would far exceed 
available intensive care unit capacity in the UK. Intermittent 
periods of more intensive lockdown-type measures are 
predicted to be effective for preventing the health-care system 
from being overwhelmed.
Figure 1: State transitions in the model
Individuals in the stochastic compartmental model are classified into susceptible, exposed, infectious (preclinical, 
clinical, or subclinical), and recovered states (ie, removed from the model). The model is stratified into 5-year age 
bands and epidemics are simulated in the 186 county-level administrative units of the UK.
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the 2·5th and 97·5th quantiles of the resulting distribution 
of simulation results. The model was implemented in R 
(version 3.6.3) and C++. An independent CODECHECK 
analysis has verified the model results are reproducible.18
Key model parameters
We collated multiple sources of evidence to estimate key 
model parameters (appendix p 10). In a meta-analysis of 
studies and preprints published before Feb 26, 2020, we 
estimated that R0 was 2·7 (95% credible interval 1·6–3·9) 
across settings without substantial control measures in 
place (appendix pp 3–4). We used age-stratified case-
fatality ratios (CFRs) estimated using case data from 
China up to Feb 11, 2020;4,19 these CFRs ranged 
substantially across age groups from 0·1% in people 
aged 20–29 years to 7·7% in those aged 80 years or older. 
These CFRs were assumed to capture the risk of death 
from COVID-19 independently of hospitalisation status. 
Using these values along with the scaling between CFR 
and hospitalised cases, we also estimated the proportion 
of clinical cases in each age group that would require 
hospitalisation, which was 0·8% in the 20–29-year age 
group and 62% in those aged 80 years or older (appendix 
p 11). All differences between children and adults in the 
model are captured by age-specific contact rates, the age-
specific probability of developing clinical symptoms of 
COVID-19 upon infection by SARS-CoV-2, and age-
specific differences in the rate of hospita li s ation and the 
CFR.
Intervention scenarios
The non-pharmaceutical interventions we analysed were 
school closures, physical distancing, shielding of older 
people (ie, ≥70 years), self-isolation of symptomatic 
individuals, and a combination of all four policies. We 
assumed these interventions would affect the rate of 
contact between individuals, as well as the relative 
infectiousness of clinically infected individuals (but not 
preclinically or subclinically infected individuals) in the 
case of self-isolation of symptomatic individuals. Separate 
contact matrices were constructed for contacts made 
at home, at work, at school, and in other contexts 
(ie, leisure, transport, and in other places), calculated 
from survey data collected in Great Britain in 2006.17 
Interventions were assumed to uniformly decrease the 
number of contacts between each pair of age groups in 
these matrices, altering the relative number of contacts 
of each type according to our best estimate of a reasonable 
reduction in contact rates under each scenario (table 1).
Shielding of older people was simulated by reducing 
contacts only for rows and columns of the contact matrix 
corresponding to individuals aged 70 years or older, and 
the overall contact matrix was the sum of the home, work, 
school, and other matrices after interventions were applied. 
We simulated self-isolation of symptomatic individuals 
by decreasing their infectiousness by 35% during the 
intervention period. This was based on a calculation that 
approximately 70% of contacts occur outside the home;17 
we assumed that these could be reduced by half for 
individuals under self-isolation, consistent with findings 
that accelerated case isolation in Shenzhen, China, 
reduced transmission by 35%.20 We included regular 
school closures for holidays in all models, based on 
national dates for school holidays in England up to 
Sept 1, 2021, setting school contacts to zero for the duration 
of these holidays and assuming schools would otherwise 
stay open unless closure was explicitly modelled.
Intervention timing and adherence
We set Jan 29, 2020, as the start date of our model (ie, when 
infections leading to sustained person-to-person 
transmission begin), which we chose by visually 
Home 
contacts
Work contacts School contacts Other contacts Infectiousness 
of clinically 
infected 
individuals
Baseline 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
School closures 100% 100% 0% 100% 100%
Physical 
distancing
100% 50% 100% 50% 100%
Shielding of 
older people
100% 25% (≥70 years); 100% (others) 100% 25% (≥70 years); 100% (others) 100%
Self-isolation 100% 100% 100% 100% 65%
Combined* 100% 25% (≥70 years); 50% (others) 0% 25% (≥70 years); 50% (others) 65%
Intensive 
interventions
100% 25% (≥70 years); 65% (others) 100% (schools open); 0% (schools closed) 16% (≥70 years); 59% (others) 65%
Lockdown 100% 10% 10% (schools open); 0% (schools closed) 10% 65%
Data are the percentages of contact rates or individual infectiousness remaining after each intervention; each intervention was assumed to affect either a component of the 
contact matrix or the infectiousness of clinically infected individuals, reducing it to the percentage shown. Where interventions include shielding of older people, 
percentages of contact rates are given separately for people aged 70 years or older and all other people. *School closures, physical distancing, shielding of older people, 
and self-isolation combined.
Table 1: Effect of intervention scenarios on contact rates and infectiousness of clinically infected individuals
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aligning model-predicted deaths to the daily number of 
COVID-19 deaths reported in the UK21 up to March 27 
(appendix pp 4, 8). Non-pharmaceutical interventions 
against previous epidemics—particularly school closures 
in response to pandemic influenza or severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS)—have typically been put in 
place for periods of 1 week to 3 months.22 Accordingly, we 
first evaluated scenarios under which non-pharmaceutical 
interventions would be deployed for 12 weeks, timed to 
begin 6 weeks before the peak incidence of new cases for 
the unmitigated epidemic. When interventions have a 
short duration, their impact can be influenced by timing. 
Moreover, if interventions are triggered at the same time 
across all locations, they can arrive too early in some 
locations and too late in others. We therefore estimated 
the impact of triggering interventions at different times—
ie by shifting the intervention by 2 weeks, 4 weeks, or 
8 weeks relative to the baseline timing—and of triggering 
each intervention either nationally (ie, with interventions 
in each county triggered relative to the unmitigated peak 
incidence across the entire UK) or at a local level (ie, with 
interventions in each county triggered relative to the 
unmitigated peak incidence for each specific county).
Adherence to interventions can vary geographically. To 
estimate the impact of such variation, we simulated the 
combined intervention (local trigger with a 4-week shift) 
with varying adherence among counties, with some 
counties selected at random to show greater adherence 
and others selected to show less adherence (appendix p 5).
Further analyses of individual interventions
We modelled the impact of control measures relating to 
leisure activities in the UK, as an addition to the 
individual interventions. As other countries in Europe 
began restricting mass gatherings, there was a question 
about the impact such measures might have in the UK, 
with a particular focus on stopping spectator sports.23 
By analysing the total attendance at spectator sports in 
the UK, we ran additional simulations to evaluate 
the potential marginal impact of such restrictions. We 
also simulated a more general reduction in leisure 
contacts—which mainly occur in pubs, bars, restau-
rants, and cinemas—by reducing them by 75%. 
Previous work on pandemic influenza has estimated 
that many individuals are likely to choose to avoid such 
settings, as they perceive them to be risky.24
As a sensitivity analysis, we also evaluated the potential 
impact of schoolchildren being cared for by grandparents 
on weekdays during school closures, because of concerns 
over whether this might counteract the benefit of closing 
schools as a result of higher-risk older adults being 
exposed to more transmission from children. Specifically, 
we simulated the introduction of an additional inter-
personal contact each weekday between children younger 
than 15 years and individuals at least 55 years older than 
the children, for either 20%, 50%, or 100% of all children 
younger than 15 years.
Intensive interventions and lockdowns
As well as single 12-week measures, we also analysed 
the impact of longer-term and repeated interventions. 
On March 16, 2020, it was announced that a package of 
intensive interventions would be put in place, including 
physical distancing, with a particular impact on leisure 
activities; workers being asked to work from home 
where possible; shielding of both older individuals 
(≥70 years) and people in high-risk groups of all ages; 
school closures; and self-isolation of symptomatic 
individuals. 
Although these intensive interventions would include 
similar measures to the combined 12-week intervention 
we had previously modelled, we devised new estimates of 
their potential impact in light of the specified details of 
the programme. In particular, we assumed that 30% of 
workers would be able to work from home,25 reducing 
work and transport contacts among the low-risk general 
population (assumed to be 90% of adults younger than 
70 years) by 30%. We also assumed leisure contacts 
(which comprise 45% of other contacts17) would decrease 
by 75% in this population. We assumed that work and 
other contacts would be reduced by 75% among the high-
risk general population (which we estimated at 10% of 
people younger than 70 years) through shielding. Among 
those aged 70 years or older, we assumed that 75% of 
work and other contacts would be reduced through 
shielding; we then further reduced transport contacts 
(which comprise 11% of other contacts17) by 30% to reflect 
less travel for workers staying at home and less travel for 
leisure activities, and reduced leisure contacts by 75% 
(table 1).
Before the announcement of intensive interventions, 
we had assessed whether shorter, repeated periods of 
particularly strict restrictions on movement—so-called 
lockdowns—could be used to supplement a longer-
term, more moderate package of interventions, with 
lockdowns to be deployed as needed to prevent the 
health system becoming overburdened. Accordingly, we 
supplemented the modelled intensive interventions 
with lockdowns phased in when COVID-19 intensive 
care unit (ICU) bed requirements reached certain 
national thresholds (1000, 2000, and 5000 beds), which 
would be kept in place until ICU bed usage fell back 
below the same trigger threshold, to then be brought in 
again as needed. We assumed that lockdowns would 
reduce all contacts outside the home by 90% from their 
baseline values and would be triggered at a national 
level rather than at a local level, and that the trigger 
threshold would not change over time.
Role of the funding source
Funders had no role in study design, data collection, data 
analysis, data interpretation, writing of the report, or the 
decision to submit for publication. The corresponding 
author had full access to all of the data and the final 
responsibility to submit for publication.
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Results
We projected that an unmitigated COVID-19 epidemic 
would result in a median 23 million (95% PI 13–30) 
clinical cases in the UK up to December, 2021 (figure 2; 
appendix p 11). Under this scenario, 85% (95% PI 57–95) 
of the population would be infected with SARS-CoV-2, 
with 42% (32–51) of those infected showing clinical 
symptoms. The unmitigated CFR was 1·5% (1·3–1·7) 
and the unmitigated infection-fatality ratio was 0·63% 
(0·45–0·79). In turn, this would result in a projected 
350 000 deaths (170 000–480 000) directly attributable to 
COVID-19, without accounting for any potential increase 
in the CFR caused by exceeding hospital capacity. The 
projected peak number of ICU beds required was 
200 000 (61 000–370 000). This is roughly 13–80 times 
ICU capacity in the UK, which we tallied at 4562 beds26–29 
in the absence of any efforts to further expand capacity.
When school closures, physical distancing, shielding of 
older people, self-isolation of symptomatic individuals, 
and the combination intervention were timed to centre 
on the peak of the unmitigated epidemic, they each 
decreased the total number of cases by 20–30% and 
delayed the peak of the epidemic by 3–8 weeks on average 
(figure 2A, B). While physical distancing was predicted to 
have the greatest impact on the total number of cases, 
shielding of older people was predicted to have the greatest 
impact on the number of deaths (appendix p 11), because 
while shielding of older people had a smaller impact on 
overall transmission, it more effectively protected the 
highest-risk individuals from infection.
We found that, when implemented alone, none of 
these shorter-duration interventions were able to 
decrease health-care need to below available capacity. 
We estimated that neither school closures, physical 
distancing, shielding of older people, nor self-isolation 
alone would reduce R0 enough to bring about a sustained 
decline in the incidence of new infections (figure 2C).
Next, we sought to evaluate the potential impact of 
combining control measures. The most comprehensive 
of these involves deploying all four individual strategies 
at the same time. This combination strategy was pro-
jected to have a greater impact on R0 (figure 2C), and in a 
small proportion (23 [12%] of 200) of simulations was 
sufficient to halt the epidemic altogether during the 
intervention period. However, lifting the interventions 
led to a rapid resurgence of cases in the model, even 
Figure 2: Impact of interventions lasting 12 weeks
(A) Daily incidence of new cases and prevalence of ICU beds required over the course of the simulated scenarios in the UK, from February to October, 2020. Divisions on the x-axis show the beginning of 
each calendar month. From 200 realisations of each projection, 11 representative simulations are shown: one for each decile of the total number of cases, with the bold curve showing the simulation 
resulting in the median projected number of cases. Tall blue shaded regions show scheduled school holiday closures, and pink shaded regions show the distribution of 12-week interventions. 
(B) Summary of simulated outputs in total number of clinical cases and deaths, clinical cases in the peak week, peak ICU beds required, peak non-ICU beds required, and the time from seeding until the 
peak of the epidemic. Vertical bars indicate 95% prediction intervals. (C) Estimated distribution of the basic reproduction number, R0, under each intervention scenario, sampled across all counties and 
model runs for each scenario. ICU=intensive care unit. 
Base School closures Physical distancing
N
ew
 ca
se
s
(t
ho
us
an
ds
)
IC
U 
be
ds
 re
qu
ire
d
(t
ho
us
an
ds
)
0
250
500
750
1000
0
100
200
300
A
Shielding of 
older people
Self-isolation Combination
N
ew
 ca
se
s
(t
ho
us
an
ds
)
IC
U 
be
ds
 re
qu
ire
d
(t
ho
us
an
ds
)
Fe
bru
ary
Ma
rchAp
ril
Ma
y
Jun
e
Jul
y
Au
gu
st
Se
pte
mb
er
Oc
tob
er
Fe
bru
ary
Ma
rchAp
ril
Ma
y
Jun
e
Jul
y
Au
gu
st
Se
pte
mb
er
Oc
tob
er
Fe
bru
ary
Ma
rchAp
ril
Ma
y
Jun
e
Jul
y
Au
gu
st
Se
pte
mb
er
Oc
tob
er
0
250
500
750
1000
0
100
200
300
Peak ICU beds 
required (thousands)
Peak non-ICU beds 
required (thousands)
Time to peak cases 
(weeks)
Total cases 
(millions)
Total deaths 
(thousands)
Cases in peak week 
(millions)
0
2
4
6
0
10
20
30
40
0
100
200
300
400
500
0
200
400
600
0
10
20
30
0
100
200
300
Base School closures Physical distancing
Shielding of older people Self-isolation Combination
B
C
Combination
Self-isolation
Shielding of older
people
Physical distancing
School closures
Base
0 1 2 3 4 5
R0
Articles
6 www.thelancet.com/public-health   Published online June 2, 2020    https://doi.org/10.1016/S2468-2667(20)30133-X
when R0 had been kept below 1 during the intervention 
period (figure 2A).
We projected that triggering interventions locally 
instead of nationally could modestly reduce the total 
number of cases and deaths, as well as reduce peak 
demands on the health-care system (figure 3A, B; 
appendix p 12). However, our simulations do not account 
for any differences in the implementation of or adherence 
to control measures that might arise from any lack of 
coordination at a national level should the timing of 
interventions vary in different parts of the country. 
Examining the simulated dynamics at a county level 
shows that the timing of local epidemics can vary among 
counties, and highlights that epidemics at a local level 
are predicted to peak more sharply than they do across 
the entire UK (figure 3C).
When only a single, 12-week intervention is deployed, 
our projections also showed that instead of centring 
measures over the unmitigated peak of cases, it was 
preferable to trigger the intervention later to reduce the 
total health burden (figure 3B). This is because the 
introduction of control measures itself shifts the peak 
later in time—ie, by flattening the curve of the epidemic—
and therefore the optimal timing of the intervention is 
also delayed (figure 3A). In particular, the most effective 
timing for introduction of measures could involve a delay 
of as much as 4 weeks (figure 3B). However, optimally 
timing an intervention could be more difficult in practice 
than these scenarios suggest, since here they are run 
with complete knowledge of when the simulated peak 
would occur in the absence of any intervention.
When varying adherence to interventions among 
counties, median outcomes were similar but less certain: 
where projections showed 14 million (95% PI 6·2–21) cases 
and 200 000 deaths (80 000–290 000) by December, 2021, 
without between-county variation, they showed 14 million 
(6·0–21) cases and 200 000 deaths (77 000–300 000) with 
county-level variation (appendix p 14).
We estimated that, in comparison with other potential 
interventions, a ban on spectator sports from March 17 to 
Sept 1, 2020, would have a relatively small impact on the 
total number of cases, namely resulting in 15 000 fewer 
cases (95% PI 110 000 fewer cases to 70 000 more cases) up 
to Sept 1 (appendix p 6). Although yearly attendance at 
sporting events is high (75·1 million spectators per year30), 
even if we assume that people make the equivalent of 
their mean daily physical contacts at such events (ie, five 
contacts per person, to make a total of 375 million), this 
number is very low relative to the number of yearly 
contacts that occur outside the context of sporting events 
(269 billion17). A more general reduction in leisure contacts 
by 75% was estimated to have a more substantial impact 
on the epidemic, reducing cases by 1·9 million (0·37–4·6) 
up to Sept 1. In other words, while banning spectator 
sports might have decreased the total number of cases, we 
estimated that other potential policies relating to leisure 
activities would probably be more effective.
When considering the potential impact of children being 
cared for by grandparents, we found that, over a period of 
school closure from March 17 (ie, after the intensive 
interventions package was announced) to July 20, 2020, 
one additional contact per weekday between children 
Figure 3: Local versus national triggering and timing of interventions
(A) Dynamics of the epidemic under local versus national triggers for introduction of the combined intervention 
(pink shaded regions). Tall blue shaded regions show regular school holiday closures whereas the pink shaded 
region shows the intervention period. From 200 realisations of each projection, 11 representative simulations are 
shown: one for each decile of the total number of new cases, with the bold curve showing the simulation resulting 
in the median projected daily incidence of cases. (B) Summary of simulated outputs in total number of clinical 
cases and deaths, clinical cases in the peak week, peak ICU beds required, peak non-ICU beds required, and the time 
from seeding until the peak of the epidemic. Vertical bars indicate 95% prediction intervals. (C) Illustration of peak 
timings of new cases varying across two counties in the UK, in comparison with predicted national trends, for a 
single simulation with no control interventions. Blue shaded regions show regular school holiday closures. 
Divisions on the x-axis in panels A and C show the beginning of each calendar month. ICU=intensive care unit.
No shift 2-week shift 4-week shift 8-week shift
N
ew
 ca
se
s (
th
ou
sa
nd
s)
0
300
600
900
N
ew
 ca
se
s (
th
ou
sa
nd
s)
N
ew
 ca
se
s (
th
ou
sa
nd
s)
0
300
600
900
A
Local trigger
N
ational trigger
Fe
bru
ary
Ma
rchAp
ril
Ma
y
Jun
e
Jul
y
Au
gu
st
Se
pte
mb
er
Fe
bru
ary
Ma
rchAp
ril
Ma
y
Jun
e
Jul
y
Au
gu
st
Se
pte
mb
er
Fe
bru
ary
Ma
rchAp
ril
Ma
y
Jun
e
Jul
y
Au
gu
st
Se
pte
mb
er
Fe
bru
ary
Ma
rchAp
ril
Ma
y
Jun
e
Jul
y
Au
gu
st
Se
pte
mb
er
Peak non-ICU beds 
required (thousands)
Time to peak cases 
(weeks)
Cases in peak week  
(millions)
Peak ICU beds required 
(thousands)
Total cases (millions) Total deaths 
(thousands)
0
100
200
300
400
500
0
100
200
300
0
10
20
30
40
0
10
20
30
0
2
4
6
0
200
400
600
Base
Local trigger: no shift
National trigger: no shift
Local trigger: 2-week shift
National trigger: 2-week shift
Local trigger: 4-week shift
National trigger: 4-week shift
Local trigger: 8-week shift
National trigger: 8-week shift
B
C
0
1
2
3
4
5
County 1
0
5
10
15
20
County 2
Ma
rch Ap
ril
Ma
y
Jun
e
Jul
y
Ma
rch Ap
ril
Ma
y
Jun
e
Jul
y
Ma
rch Ap
ril
Ma
y
Jun
e
Jul
y
0
100
200
300
UK
Articles
www.thelancet.com/public-health   Published online June 2, 2020    https://doi.org/10.1016/S2468-2667(20)30133-X 7
younger than 15 years and an older individual could, in the 
worst case—ie, at the upper limit of the 95% PI—almost 
entirely eliminate the benefit of closing schools in terms of 
the number of deaths and peak ICU bed occupancy. 
Specifically, closing schools reduced deaths from 120 000 
(95% PI 380–270 000) to 65 000 (150–260 000) and reduced 
peak ICU beds required from 53 000 (190–170 000) to 
29 000 (580–140 000) up to July 20, but introducing one 
additional contact per weekday between children and older 
individuals for all children increased deaths to 79 000 
(160–290 000) and increased peak ICU beds required to 
35 000 (560–160 000) up to July 20 (appendix p 13).
When modelling the likely impact of the proposed 
intensive interventions strategy, we found implemen-
tation of these measures had the potential to delay the 
peak of the epidemic by 7 weeks (95% PI 1–49), from 
12 weeks (9–20) to 19 weeks (10–69) after the start of 
community transmission, and to reduce the total number 
of deaths by half (figure 4A; table 2). Despite this 
substantial reduction in burden, the projections still 
showed a large number of cases (1·9–20 million), and a 
large number of ICU beds (8300–130 000) occupied 
during the peak of the epidemic (figure 4B; table 2). 
Indeed, we projected that ICU bed capacity could be 
exceeded by five times or more for several weeks. While 
we did not explicitly predict the impact of this on 
mortality rates, this would almost certainly lead to a 
substantially increased CFR.
We found that adding periods of lockdown to the 
intensive interventions scenario, to be triggered when 
ICU beds required for patients with COVID-19 exceeded 
a threshold of either 1000, 2000, or 5000 beds nationally, 
would still result in a high number of ICU beds being 
occupied, but at much lower levels than the scenario 
without lockdowns (figure 4A). Lockdown periods were 
sufficient to bring R0 near or below 1 (figure 4C), and 
Figure 4: Projected impact of intensive control measures with reactive lockdowns
(A) Dynamics of the epidemic under different triggers for introduction and lifting of lockdowns (median timing of lockdowns shown as low grey shaded areas). Divisions on the x-axis show the beginning 
of each calendar month. From 200 realisations of each projection, 11 representative simulations are shown: one for each decile of the total number of ICU beds required, with the bold curve showing 
the simulation resulting in the median projected ICU bed requirement. Horizontal guides show the estimated number of ICU beds in the UK as of January, 2020 (solid line), and with a hypothetical 
doubling of capacity (dashed line). Tall blue shaded regions show school closures whereas the pink shaded region shows a background period of intensive interventions. Dynamics are shown up to 
April, 2021 (intensive interventions) or September, 2021 (lockdown scenarios), but all scenarios were modelled up to the end of December, 2021. (B) Summary of simulated outputs in total number of 
clinical cases and deaths, clinical cases in the peak week, peak ICU beds required, peak non-ICU beds required, and the time from seeding until the peak of the epidemic. Vertical bars indicate 95% prediction 
intervals. (C) Estimated distribution of the basic reproduction number, R0, under three different interventions—intensive physical distancing with schools open and closed, and lockdown—sampled across 
all counties and model runs for each scenario. ICU=intensive care unit.
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hence to bring about a decrease in the incidence of new 
infections. We found that, depending on the threshold 
ICU bed occupancy at which lockdown periods were 
triggered, there was a tradeoff between having fewer, 
longer lockdown periods (lower threshold) and having 
more frequent, shorter lockdown periods (higher 
threshold), with the higher thresholds resulting in less 
time spent in lockdown overall but higher peak demands 
on ICU bed capacity (figure 4; table 2). Lower thresholds 
also resulted in more individuals remaining susceptible 
at the end of the simulation period (table 2), potentially 
increasing the total duration for which recurrent lock-
downs would need to be maintained. The recurrent 
lockdown scenario with the most stringent triggering 
threshold of 1000 ICU beds occupied by COVID-19 
patients reduced total COVID-19 deaths by 58% (95% PI 
30–80) relative to the intensive interventions scenario, 
and by 86% (64–96) relative to the unmitigated epidemic.
Discussion
Using an age-structured transmission dynamic model, 
we explored different scenarios for COVID-19 trans-
mission and control in the general population of the UK. 
We found that moderate interventions lasting for 
12 weeks, such as school closures, self-isolation of 
symptomatic individuals, or shielding of older people, 
would probably not have been sufficient to control the 
epidemic and to avoid far exceeding available ICU 
capacity, even when these measures were used in 
combination. In particular, school closures had little 
effect in our projections, despite our model accounting 
for substantial asymptomatic transmission among 
children.16 This contrasts with strategies aimed at 
suppressing the spread of pandemic influenza, for which 
school closures are often a key intervention.16,31 However, 
we estimated that a scenario in which more intense 
lockdown measures were implemented for shorter 
periods, against a general background of physical 
distancing measures, might be able to keep projected 
case numbers at a level that would not overwhelm the 
health system. These findings are consistent with studies 
that explored subsets of these control measures for 
COVID-19 in the UK,11 France,15 the USA,12 and Canada.13 
However, we integrate model trajectories over a 
distribution of values for R0 and seeding dates to provide 
uncertainty bounds for our projections, explore the 
impact of alternative timings of interventions, and 
account for variation in the proportion of symptomatic 
cases by age as estimated from case data.16 Directly 
comparing these projections to the ongoing COVID-19 
epidemic in the UK is complicated because enacted 
control measures have not exactly followed the scenarios 
outlined here. However, as a point of comparison, recent 
empirical estimates of the reproduction number in 
the UK32,33 are compatible with our assumptions 
concerning R0 and the impact of lockdown measures 
(appendix p 13).
The model presented here is subject to several 
limitations. Because the model does not explicitly 
structure individuals by household, we are unable to 
evaluate the impact of measures based on household 
contacts, such as household quarantine, where all 
members of a household with a suspected COVID-19 case 
remain in isolation. Such contact-targeted measures could 
increase the impact of a package of interventions by 
limiting spread in the community. However, the presence 
of asymptomatic infections34 means that isolation based 
on symptomatic case identification would be unlikely to 
fully prevent ongoing transmission. We also do not 
explicitly include individual-level variation in transmission 
(ie, so-called superspreading events35), although if 
considered at the individual level, the processes underlying 
the model would generate sub stantial variation from case 
to case. There are several examples of such events for 
COVID-19,36 and individual-level variation is probably 
important in influencing the success of control measures 
in the very early stages of an outbreak.5 However, as 
outbreaks of directly transmitted infections become larger, 
Intensive interventions Lockdown with 1000-bed 
trigger
Lockdown with 2000-bed 
trigger
Lockdown with 5000-bed 
trigger
Total cases, millions* 11 (1·9–20) 4·1 (0·85–12) 6·3 (1·2–14) 9·5 (1·5–16)
Total deaths* 120 000 (27 000–260 000) 50 000 (9300–160 000) 76 000 (15 000–190 000) 120 000 (22 000–220 000)
Cases in peak week 720 000 (170 000–3 000 000) 120 000 (46 000–700 000) 180 000 (86 000–980 000) 330 000 (160 000–1 400 000)
Deaths in peak week 8300 (2300–37 000) 1400 (510–9000) 2100 (930–13 000) 3400 (1800–17 000)
Peak ICU beds required 29 000 (8300–130 000) 4900 (1800–32 000) 7500 (3500–44 000) 12 000 (6700–62 000)
Peak non-ICU beds required 55 000 (15 000–250 000) 9100 (3600–60 000) 14 000 (6800–83 000) 23 000 (13 000–120 000)
Time to peak cases, weeks 19 (10–69) 60 (8–92) 60 (8–72) 35 (8–69)
Time spent in lockdown 
(Jan 29, 2020—Dec 31, 2021)
·· 69% (13–88) 56% (9·2–76) 33% (2·8–52)
Total infected, millions* 27 (5·3–46) 11 (2·1–29) 17 (3·0–33) 25 (4·4–38)
Data are median (95% prediction interval) and are given to two significant figures. Time to peak cases is measured from Jan 29, 2020. Totals are calculated up to Dec 31, 2021. 
ICU=intensive care unit. *Simulations were run to Dec 31, 2021, so reported total cases, deaths, and infections under the lockdown projections do not capture any cases, 
deaths, or infections occurring after this point.
Table 2: Projected impact of intensive control measures and lockdown in the UK
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the population-level dynamics will predominantly be 
driven by the average mixing pattern between key 
epidemiological groups, particularly between different 
ages.16,37 We therefore used a stochastic model to capture 
variation in these population-level dynamics. Our pro-
ections focus on COVID-19 trans mission in the general 
population of the UK, and so do not account for 
health-care-associated transmission and the interventions 
appropriate for controlling trans mission in health-care 
settings. We also assumed that individuals would be 
immune after infection for at least 1–2 years (ie, the 
duration of the period considered). Duration of antibody 
responses to SARS coronavirus lasts for 2–3 years in most 
patients,38 and modelling has suggested that SARS-CoV-2 
could enter into regular circulation if immunity is not 
permanent.12 However, the latter study suggests that short-
term projections (ie, approximately 1 year), such as those 
presented here, are relatively insensitive to assumptions 
about the duration of immunity.
We also assumed that subclinically infected individuals 
were 50% as infectious as clinical cases. A study of 2147 close 
contacts in Ningbo, China, estimated that the mean onward 
transmission from asymptomatic infections was 65% (95% 
high density interval 20–120) that of symptomatic cases.34 
However, symptomatic cases were found to be more likely 
to generate new symptomatic infections compared with 
asymptomatic infections. This suggests that the overall 
relative contribution of asymptomatic individuals to new 
infections might be lower than 65%, and hence 50% is a 
plausible assumption. We used mixing matrices for the UK 
measured in 2006,17 and changes in contact patterns since 
then might alter the potential effect of interventions. The 
length of stay in ICU and the fractions of hospitalisation, 
ICU use, and death are estimated using data from China, 
and differences in UK populations could affect our 
estimates of health-care demand.
Finally, projections for the relative impact of the various 
physical distancing measures explored here are estimates 
only. The COVID-19 epidemic is without precedent in 
recent history, so it was not possible to make substantially 
data-driven assumptions concerning the impact of non-
pharmaceutical interventions on contact patterns. It 
remains difficult to estimate the relative impact of 
potential constituent interventions even now, since a 
substantial package of interventions was implemented in 
short succession across the UK. Nonetheless, there is 
some indication that our assumptions concerning the 
impact of full-population lockdown are consistent with 
measurements of the effective R05 and of contact 
rates between individuals33 in the lockdown period 
(appendix p 13). We are also unable to explicitly 
decompose physical distancing measures into constituent 
components, such as staying 2 m apart, increased hand 
washing, and face mask wearing, as the relative 
effectiveness of these components has not yet been 
estimated. While our analysis shows that periodic 
lockdowns could substantially reduce the burden of 
COVID-19 without measures being in place indefinitely, 
there are likely to be better strategies for selecting the 
timing and duration of lockdowns than those explored 
here.
The results we present here summarise the key 
analyses and scenarios we presented to decision makers 
over February–March, 2020, which evolved continuously 
as new information became available. A reasonable 
worst-case scenario with and without school closures, 
focusing on Birmingham as an illustrative example, was 
presented to the Scientific Pandemic Influenza Group on 
Modelling, which gives expert advice to the UK 
Department of Health and Social Care and wider UK 
Government, on Feb 26, 2020. This was followed by an 
exploration of national-level impact of shorter-duration 
interventions (as in figure 2) presented on March 2, 2020, 
which explored various assumptions concerning inter-
vention length and efficacy. We expanded our analysis to 
explicitly cover all counties in England and analysed the 
timing of measures, and local versus national deployment 
of interventions (as in figure 3), on March 8, 2020. Our 
analyses of the impact of curtailing sporting events and 
leisure activities (as in appendix p 6), and of the potential 
impact of repeated lockdown measures (as in figure 4), 
were presented on March 11, 2020. Our sensitivity 
analysis for increased child–grandparent contacts (as in 
appendix p 6) was presented on March 17, 2020. The 
results shown in this Article are based on an updated 
version of the model and reflect our current state 
of knowledge about the transmission dynamics of 
COVID-19. However, our overall conclusions about the 
relative effectiveness of different strategies for reducing 
the burden of COVID-19 in the UK are the same as those 
presented to decision makers in real time.
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